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Abstract 
The traditional core functions of a classical ombudsman are the investigation of individual complaints and 
own motion investigations of administrative action into areas of systemic importance.  The ombudsman 
institution is an evolving one.  Classical ombudsmen are using their systemic investigation powers more 
frequently to improve the quality of public administration.  Further, there is an increasing variety of 
functions, such as auditing and monitoring, which are now ascribed  to the jurisdiction of ombudsmen.  
This article investigates the changes occurring in the scale and scope of ombudsmen functions and argues 
that three models of classical ombudsman may now be identified.  An explanation of  these models and the 
reasons for changes in the operation of ombudsmen are provided through the experience of the nine 
Australian Federal, State and Territory classical ombudsmen.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The word ‘ombudsman’ is a powerful brand name1 used to describe a model of institution which originates 
from the 1809 Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman (Riksdagens ombudsman).  Today ombudsmen are both 
global in operation and multifaceted in nature, existing on every continent, at every level of government, 
across both public and private sectors. Ombudsmen are ever evolving and the expansion of the ombudsman 
institution is not just one of scale but is also one of scope.
2
 One important recent development is the 
changing focus of the classical ombudsman jurisdiction from primarily providing redress to individual’s 
complaints to placing more emphasis upon systemic investigations and expanding functions to include 
auditing and monitoring which have the primary goal of improving the overall quality of public 
administration.    
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As Caiden states ‘[T]he existence of the ombudsman formally acknowledges that government 
though good is fallible and could be improved’.3  The aim of this article is to examine the different models 
of the classical ombudsman which have been developed to promote good administration.
 
Part 2 of this 
article identifies three models of classical ombudsman which reflect the degree to which an ombudsman 
office promotes improving the quality of government administration a role which ‘is being given increased 
priority by a number of ombudsman around the world’. 4  Part 3 then explains why these differing models 
have developed in an Australian context.  It argues that critical factors which determine the degree to which 
an ombudsman focuses upon the promotion of good administration across government will include: the 
agenda and the discretion afforded to individual ombudsman in terms of the legislative and institutional 
framework of its operation; the historical, political and legal environment of the jurisdiction within which 
the ombudsman operates; and the degree of regard within which the institution is held.     
 
2.  MODELS OF CLASSICAL OMBUDSMAN  
 
2.1 The first model: The Reactive Ombudsman Model (ROM) 
 




An office provided for by the constitution or by an action of the legislature or parliament and 
headed by an independent, high-level public official who is responsible to the legislature or 
parliament, who receives complaints from aggrieved persons against government agencies, 
officials and employees or who acts on his own motion, and who has the power to 




This definition captures the first model of classical ombudsman, titled ‘the Reactive Ombudsman Model’.  
This model describes an institution having the core role of individual complaint-handling, the traditional 
role of most classical ombudsmen.
6
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Critically however while this model is ‘primarily a client-oriented office, designed to secure individual 
justice in the administrative state’7  it also has an equally important function of being concerned to improve 
government decision-making.  Thus, a ROM is not merely an instrument of redress, but also will have the 
function of quality control of government administration. The ROM therefore embeds two functions.  
Firstly, a reactive role of providing redress for the individual complainant and secondly, a proactive role of 
being concerned that administrative failures are rectified to prevent mistakes form occurring in the future.  
 
The title ‘reactive ombudsman’ is therefore not intended to imply that this model has no proactive 
functions – rather it is used to expose the emphasis placed by such ombudsmen upon resolving disputes 
between government administration and the individual complainant.  An ombudsman belonging to the 
ROM will usually exercise proactive activities through using discretion to initiate own-motion 
investigations.  Such systemic investigations aim to generate recommendations to improve procedures, 
policy or legislation.  This role of the ROM is generally closely aligned with the individual complaint 
handling role: 
 
The own motion power may be used, for example, to investigate deficiencies of a systemic character 
(that is, where it appears there are problems associated with an agency’s practices, policies, or 
procedures). Such an investigation may be undertaken because a specific complaint has pointed to 
the possibility of some underlying systemic problem or because the receipt of a number of 




This proactive power therefore operates in concert with or independently from the individual complaint 
handling role.  
 
Arguably to be a ROM there is no requirement that a discretionary own motion power be part of 
the ombudsman jurisdiction nor that it be exercise with any frequency.  This is the case as the systemics 
role of the ombudsman institution includes any or all functions which transcend the individual complainant. 
At its broadest any function of the ombudsman which aims to improve the normative decision-making 
processes of government administration is part of its proactive role. Such functions may therefore be 
characterized as the recommendations and investigations which aim to improve procedures, policy or 
legislation.  Often ombudsmen will perform the two processes simultaneously: the reactive process of 
individual complaint-handling being dependent on the incidence of conflict while the proactive counterpart 
role of making recommendations and  suggesting positive change to administration as a result of the 
individual complaints is done on a continual basis. Looked at from this broad perspective the own motion 
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power is but one example of the proactive powers of the ROM. There may be no need to exercise an own 
motion investigation to improve the system more universally.   
 
The ROM describes many international ombudsmen offices.  For example Seneviratne notes its 
applicability to the work of ombudsman in the United Kingdom
9
 and in a now rather dated survey of 
ombudsman worldwide undertaken by Haller 
10
  41 of the 43 ombudsman surveyed internationally said that 
besides individual complaint handling one of their functions was to improve administrative practices.  One 
of the best examples of the ROM  is the first modern ombudsman, the Swedish Ombudsman, which has 
authority to ensure that public complaints against public officials have an avenue for resolution and also 
has the proactive own motion powers. Another example, of a ROM which actively uses systemic 
investigations to pursue proactive administrative improvement is the Ontario Ombudsman office. 
 
This dual role of the ROM  - of conflict resolution and conflict prevention  (to investigate individual 
complaints and to rectify systemic administrative failures)  is echoed in judicial dicta.  The clearest 
formulation of such support in an early common law decision on public sector or classical ombudsman is 
made in Alberta, Canada in 1970, Chief Justice Milvain states in Re Ombudsman Act (1970) (72 W.W.R. 
176, 190 and 192): 
 
the basic purpose of an Ombudsman is provision of a 'watchdog' designed to look into the 
entire workings of administrative cases. ... [he] can bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise 
dark places even over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds. If [his] scrutiny and 
reservations are well founded, corrective measure can be taken in due democratic process, if 
not no harm can be done in looking at that which is good. 
 
In Australia all nine classical ombudsmen (one Federal Ombudsman, six State Ombudsmen and two 
Territory Ombudsmen) 
11
 originally belonged  to this first model of Ombudsmen.  Introduced in the 1970s 
the focus of each office was to generally one of emphasis upon the individual complainant
12
 with all offices 
having the capacity to exercise a proactive own motion power to initiate investigations at their discretion. 
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This dominant emphasis placed upon the reactive individual complaint handling function was a direct result 
of modeling the Australian institution on existing ombudsman – particularly that of the New Zealand 
Ombudsman which had been appointed in 1962 under the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 
1962 (NZ).  
 
2.2 The second model: Variegated Ombudsman Model (VOM) 
 
Today in Australia none of the nine classical Ombudsmen may less easily be categorised as 
belonging to the first ROM.  Instead almost all offices belong to a second model – the Variegated 
Ombudsman Model.  This model is characterized by an increasing scale and scope in jurisdiction of 
classical ombudsman.  While the emphasis of the institutions in this model remains upon the essential core 
features of an ombudsman (as described under ROM) what distinguishes this group of ombudsmen is 
growth in both the number and variety of functions they perform.   
 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman is an example of a VOM.  From inception, the Ombudsman Act 
1976 (Cth), established the Commonwealth Ombudsman as having a core focus upon individual complaints   
and also as having a systemic role of suggesting reform and improvements to government administrative 
systems.
13
   Today the Commonwealth Ombudsman performs separately titled roles of Australian Capital 
Territory Ombudsman, Defence Force Ombudsman, Taxation Ombudsman, Immigration Ombudsman, 
Law Enforcement Ombudsman, Postal Industry Ombudsman and Overseas Student Ombudsman.    
 
While significant in identifying the scope of the operations of an ombudsman, the number of titles 
an office may carry is itself not determinative of categorisation as belonging to the VOM.  Such 
categorization  may also depend upon the variety of functions performed by an institution. The 
Commonwealth Ombudsman has increasingly taken on new functions of inspecting, auditing and 
monitoring functions to ensure agencies comply with legislative requirements.  These are ‘new’ function 
for ombudsmen. Auditing and monitoring are separated from the more traditional roles of complaint-
handling and system-fixing in that they imply a lack of interference by ombudsmen in agency policy and 
processes and instead represent a role which is one of verification and examination.  They also are 
functions which are carried out to promote the protection of individuals  – particularly vulnerable 
individuals such as indigenous persons and suspected illegality.  Recognition of the importance of this role 
has been noted by Australian ombudsmen. For example, in 2004–05 the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
states: ‘[C]ompliance auditing has now developed as a distinct third function of the office, in addition to its 
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traditional functions of complaint investigation and own motion investigations’.14 Such  unique and 
additional roles may direct the classification of an ombudsman as belonging to the VOM. 
 
Similarly, other Australian State and Territory ombudsman have increased the scope of their 
jurisdiction to extend to functions which differ from  the traditional dual roles of individual complaint 
handler and systemic investigator. For example the Western Australian Ombudsman now has an extension 
of jurisdiction to investigate child deaths and telephone interception and the Western Australian 
Ombudsman, like the Tasmanian Ombudsman, performs a private industry ombudsman role - both offices 
being the Energy Ombudsman for gas and electricity. This practice of classical ombudsman performing 
separate roles of complaint handling for private industry and non-traditional government areas is now 
echoed across most Australia jurisdictions (the exception may be the South Australian ombudsman which 
could be categorised as ROM  although the South Australian ombudsman notes it will commence a 
program of ‘systemic audits’ from 2010-201115  ). So, for example, the Northern Territory Ombudsman is 
also the Commissioner for Health and Community Services Complaints. 
 
Another example of the classification of a classical ombudsman as a VOM is the grant of an 
additional legislative human rights role.  On 1 January 2007, the Victorian Government through the 
Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 conferred an express human rights 
mandate upon the Victorian Ombudsman.  When examined from a human rights perspective this explicit 
conferral of human rights legislative powers created  the first sub-national human rights or hybrid 
ombudsman 
16
 in Australia.     From a human rights perspective the Victorian Ombudsman thus joins the 50 
per cent of the worlds ombudsman institutions which may be categorised as human rights ombudsman.
17
   
When viewed from a classical ombudsman perspective the Victorian Ombudsman is belongs to the VOM, 
having an explicit mandate to protect and promote human rights of individuals. This addition of an express 
human rights mandate marks a new focus for an Australian State classical ombudsman with respect to 
ensuring that administrative decision-making with respect to the delivery of government services is carried 
out in accordance with human rights principles. 
 
Of course there is growing recognition amongst all Australian ombudsmen that their work has a 
human rights focus.  Such awareness and the degree to which it impacts upon the work of an ombudsman 
may variously categorise an office as a ROM  or a VOM. For example the operation of the Human Rights 
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The Ombudsman’s office also plays an important role in human rights protection. The right 
to complain is both a right in itself, implicit in the civil and political rights listed in the 
Human Rights Act, and one of the best mechanisms to ensure that all other rights can be 
protected. It establishes a fundamental status for the individual in his or her dealings with 
government. The existence of public sector ombudsmen and other such bodies is crucial to 
minimising the inequality of power, resources and information that can prevent this right, and 
those available through it, from being exercised. 
 
Another identifier of the VOM may be the degree to which the Ombudsman performs a role in 
educating government agencies to improve standards of complaint handling.  So, for example, the 
Queensland Ombudsman states on its website that: ‘As part of our ongoing commitment to improve public 
sector administrative practice, we offer training to State government agencies and local councils across 
Queensland in the following areas: 
 Good Decisions Training  
 Complaints Management Training  
 Ethical Decision Making Training  
Such educative functions locate an ombudsman office outside of the ROM as it signifies a formal role in 
participating in educational reform across government departments and agencies.  This function may also 
include making submissions to government inquiries with respect to law reform and the publication of 
newsletters and E-Bulletins on improving administrative practice to government departments.
19
   
 
Significantly these educative functions may be part of a wider concept of community engagement 
where a VOM  may perceive its role as informing and protecting the wider community.  This community 
engagement function as pursued by a VOM has an activist flavor.  For example, again returning to the 




The Office’s first public report on an investigation was published in Parliament in May 2002. 
The 'Brooke Brennan' report – An investigation into the adequacy of the actions of certain 
government agencies in relation to the safety of the late Brooke Brennan, aged three – was 
tabled in Parliament on 31 May 2002. The report succeeded in raising public awareness of 
major deficiencies in the operation of the child protection system in Queensland and led to 
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some significant improvements in the system, including a better process for reviewing child 
deaths.  
 
Such engagement is targeted not only at public awareness of the work of the ombudsman but to educate the 
public to become activists for government change and thereby improving administrative processes.   
 
Finally, it is important to note that despite the plethora of roles, the changes to jurisdiction and an 
increased focus on the quality of public administration, a VOM  retains the individual complainant as its 




One of the primary functions of the Ombudsman’s office is to handle complaints and 
enquiries from members of the public about government administrative action. The aim is to 
promote fairness and accountability by fostering integrity and legislative compliance in 
agency administration. 
 
2.3 The third model: Proactive Ombudsman Model (POM)  
 
There is no ‘requirement’ that an ombudsman exhibit a duality of roles of being both a system 
fixer and a change agent in order to be titled ‘ombudsman’.  To take both extremes this means that an 
ombudsman may be solely an individual complaint handler, and conversely, may be wholly a systemic 
reformer. In actuality most ombudsman lie somewhere between those two end points and this is why most 
classical ombudsman will fall into ROM or VOM.   There is also no need for the two roles to conflict – 
however as Seneviratne notes ‘decisions have to be made about which functions should take precedence’.  22  
It is where such a conscious decision has been made to primarily pursue the proactive function that an 
ombudsman will be part of the Proactive Ombudsman Model (POM).   
 
In Australia the NSW Ombudsman is an example of the POM. As Mr Bruce Barbour, the current 





We need to accept that change will happen, and we need to be the driver of this change, to 
look for better and more effective ways to operate, to re-shape the Ombudsman model to 
keep pace with community needs and expectations, to explore and question – to see as 
possible what we have previously thought was not. This will be essential if we are to remain 
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relevant. Thinking this way has taken my office into very different decision making practices, 
thinking carefully about where we place our focus and the way we prioritise and undertake 
our work. We have evolved from a reactive complaint handling body into a forward-thinking, 
strategic, community focussed and proactive office. Using the core principles of our Swedish 
heritage, building on them, developing them to meet the needs and circumstances of our own 
community. Placing them in today’s context and planning for tomorrow. 
 
While a large number of Australian ombudsmen – in particular the Commonwealth Ombudsman and 
the Queensland Ombudsman - are increasingly giving  emphasis to prioritising proactive standard-setting 
roles rather than the traditional role of reactive complaint-handling only the NSW Ombudsman states that it 
promotes its proactive roles over its reactive complaint handling role.    The New South Wales Ombudsman 
actively restricts the number of individual complaints taken in order to focus upon its system fixing role of 
improving administrative justice.
24
 For example, the NSW Ombudsman fact sheet which contains 
information for individuals complaining about government agencies, states that ‘[W]e do not have the 
resources to investigate every complaint, so priority is given to serious matters, especially if it is an issue 
that is likely to affect other people. If we cannot take up your complaint we will tell you why.’25 Further, in 




We help organisations to prevent or reduce the level of complaints made about them by 
reviewing their systems. Our proactive work also allows us to address problems if members 
of the public have legitimate grievances but, for whatever reason, do not or cannot take up 
the complaint themselves. We aim to reduce the volume of complaints to our office by 
providing training and advice to the organisations we scrutinise about how to effectively 
resolve and manage complaints. We also provide assistance, guidance and training to other 
watchdog agencies. 
 
Both the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Queensland Ombudsman hover between being a VOM  and 
a POM – see for example the comments by the recently retired Ombudsman Mr David Bevan in the where 
he refers to the complaint handling and improving administration role as being a ‘blend of functions’ which 
‘makes our Office such an effective catalyst for positive change in the public sector’.27  The NSW 
Ombudsman however is clearly part of the  VOM. 
 
Critically in terms of the goals and operation of the VOM  the NSW Ombudsman still regards individual 
complainants as significant.   It is however the scope of the non-individual complaint handling and non-
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own motion  systemic investigations work which categorises the NSW Ombudsman as being part of the 
VOM. The jurisdiction of the NSW Ombudsman extends beyond traditional government agencies to focus 




We are responsible for keeping the following types of organisations under scrutiny: 
 agencies delivering public services – including police, correctional centres and state-owned 
corporations 
 organisations delivering services to children – including schools and child care centres 
 organisations delivering community services – including services for people with disabilities, 
people who are homeless and elderly people 
 agencies conducting covert operations – including the Crime Commission and the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption. 
 
We have other specific functions that relate to: 
 the causes and patterns of deaths of certain children and people with disabilities 
 decisions made by public sector agencies 
 the administration of the witness protection program 
 the implementation of new pieces of legislation conferring additional powers on people such 
as police and correctional officers. 
 
Apart from the scope of the work the scale is also of significance for classification as a VOM.  For example, 
with respect to community engagement and education, the distinguishing feature between the NSW 
Ombudsman and ombudsmen that fall within the VOM is the size of the operations of the Office.  In 2009-
2010 the NSW Ombudsman: 
 
 Undertook more than 271 information, community education and training activities reaching over 
10,237 people, including providing 144 training workshops.
29
 
 Hosted three community forums (one of which was attended by 300 people) on domestic violence, 
probity and the devolution of large institutions;
30
  
 Initiated a roundtable forum of government agencies to examine the various screening processes 
that funded services use when checking for information about the probity of prospective 
employees, board or management committee members and other volunteers involved in the 
planning or delivery of community services - the roundtable resulted in a report containing 
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It is however the scope of the multifaceted functions of the NSW Ombudsman that render it a POM  
rather than the role that the Office plays in agitation for change.  As Mr Barbour states: 
 
While our work may lead to legislative or policy changes, this is not our primary aim or goal. 
Our role is to act in the public interest, to ensure the lawful exercise of powers, good 




Central to the categorization of the NSW Ombudsman as a VOM is the view the office has that it can play a 
role in shaping, protecting and promoting community expectations. 
 
Importantly the NSW Ombudsman does not view itself as an advocate for the community or for 
government.  Indeed in this sense the NSW Ombudsman remains faithful to its Swedish heritage and the 
shared grundnorm of Ombudsman.  Rather than being an advocate the NSW Ombudsman is a VOM due to 
the scope of its operations across the whole of government. Indeed viewed from this perspective the 
individual complaint handling role of the NSW Ombudsman remains critical and is afforded due tribute as 





In our first year, we received complaints about 138 different public authorities. This year, we 
dealt with complaints about almost 1,000 agencies and organisations. These included both 
public and private sector bodies, providing a broad range of services. This number may well 
increase with future changes to our jurisdiction. 
 
The scope and extent of the NSW Ombudsman proactive operations rather than any change in core values 
which renders the Office part of the POM.  
 
3. WHY AN INCREASING DIVERSITY OF CLASSICAL OMBUDSMAN 
MODELS? 
 
There are three main reasons which explain the identification of three models of classical ombudsman in 
Australia:  
 
Firstly, ombudsmen adapt to fit their jurisdiction. As a Federation each Australian level of 
government - State, Federal and Territory - had its own unique requirements and the model introduced in 
every jurisdiction was a deliberate and considered choice. The Australian ombudsmen model was from the 
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very beginning, one which was adapted to the Australian system of government.  The shared history of 
Australian ombudsmen should not mask the reality which is a diversity of function and operation as every 
Australian government calibrated ombudsmen for its own political environment. The introduction and 
development of each of the nine ombudsman offices in Australia is therefore idiosyncratic.  Indeed, this is 
reflective more generally of the transplantation and adaptation of the institution to suit varied political, 
economic and social requirements has occurred since the first transportation of ombudsman.  For example, 
writing in 1970 Barrie
34
 observes the significant jurisdictional differences between the first four classical 
ombudsman introduced outside of Sweden - Finland (1919), Denmark (1954), Norway (1962) and New 
Zealand (1962): 
 
Finland, for example, has paid special attention to inmates of institutions where people are 
involuntarily restrained. In Sweden great importance has been placed on the control of 
inferior judicial tribunals. In New Zealand and Denmark provision has been made for 
complaints emanating from civil servants about employment conditions, promotion and 
discipline.  
 
It follows that just as the creation of an ombudsman will suit the political environment within which it 
operates so will each individual office adapt to changes within that environment.   
 
The identification of three models of Australian classical ombudsmen originates from the mid-
1990s, coinciding with the changing way that government delivers services.  The privatization and 
corporatization of previously government run monopolies such as telecommunications, gas, water and 
electricity not only introduced new complexities into complaint resolution handling but also resulted in the 
creation of new complaint handling bodies such as private industry ombudsman.  The creation of such 
bodies has meant that Australian ombudsman have had to maintain their relevance and carve out a niche for 
themselves in an ever growing landscape of integrity bodies which govern disputes between citizen and the 
state and the consumer and industry . 
To illustrate this point further – a clear ramification of this external change is a growth in classical 
ombudsman jurisdiction to cover previously private sector services.  For example the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman  now has an explicit jurisdiction to investigate complaints against government service 
providers, defined as a non-government entity that is providing goods or services to the public under a 
contract with a government agency (Ombudsman Act s 3BA (CTH)). This extended jurisdiction is 
important in enabling efficient investigation of complaints about immigration detention, which is managed 
by a private company, and against non-government organisations that play a pivotal role in assisting job 
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seekers and benefit claimants as part of the Welfare to Work and Job Network programs.
35
 Also the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman in its Postal Industry Ombudsman role can deal with complaints against both 
Australia Post (a government business enterprise) and private postal operators that register with the scheme.  
Secondly, for an office to expand its functions there must be a willingness from the Ombudsman to 
take the additional powers on.  Of course how an office is managed is very much a matter of the personal 
style and working methods of the incumbent Ombudsman.
36
 Professor John McMillan, the previous 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, noted one of his reasons for taking on new powers being that:   
 
A perennial concern of Ombudsman offices is their meagre funding, especially as contrasted 
to the growth in size and functions of the government agencies the Ombudsman oversights. 
History indicates that Ombudsman offices do not get extra funding and support from 
government by bleating about their restricted funding. On the other hand, recent 
developments illustrate that Ombudsman offices will be given extra funding by government 
if they can demonstrate their ability and effectiveness in discharging new functions. Indeed, a 
strong theme in contemporary budgetary policy around Australia is that government agencies 
face annual efficiency dividends that can reduce their core funding, but this can be countered 
by acquiring a new function that attracts additional funding. The adoption of new functions 




On a slightly different note the significance of the input of Ombudsman is critical as a change in focus of 
an office does not have to be driven by legislative jurisdictional change, rather may be implemented by the 
use of discretion by ombudsman   A sharper focus on own motion investigations and a decreasing 
importance placed upon individual complainants may significantly alter the role of an office and the 
emphasis it places upon improving the quality of government administration.  
 
Thirdly, the growth of Ombudsman functions reflects acceptance and trust of the institution within 
Australian jurisdictions.  Ombudsmen are efficient, free and offer access to justice widely accepted as an 
alternative pathway to the resolution of disputes outside of the judicial system.  This coincides with a 
growing appreciation in Australia of the usefulness of Assisted Dispute Resolution techniques.
38
 Australian 
ombudsmen are now entrenched as independent, impartial and fair dispute resolution offices.  Their role in 
preserving and upholding the rule of law is widely acknowledged. Trust in the institution in terms of both 
                                                 
35
 McMillan, J. (2008) ‘The expanding role of the Ombudsman: What fits? What doesn’t?’ available at 
www.ombudsman.gov.au. 
36 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1980–81) 56. 
37
 McMillan ‘The expanding role of the Ombudsman’. 
38
 Field, C. (2009) ‘Recent evolutions in Australian Ombudsmen’ Presentation to the Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law National Forum 3. 
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its permanency in the legal and political landscape and its ability to deliver results has been a direct 
contributor to an institution which has increased in scale and scope.  
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
Internationally classical ombudsmen are increasing the scope of their jurisdiction so that today an 
ombudsman may perform  any or all of the functions of: individual complaint handler; human rights 
protector; own motion investigator (proactive systemic change agent or system fixer); auditor; protector of 
whistleblowers; reviewer of witness protection; reviewing child abuse and reportable deaths; educator; 
community change agent etc.  Such multifaceted functions render the allocation of ombudsman into the 
traditional models of classical ombudsman increasingly strained.  Such traditional models include: the 
‘redress and control’ model;39  division along the lines of function such as into three models - basic or 
classical model, the rule of law model and human rights model;
40





Classical ombudsmen are increasingly heterogeneous – a fact which Kuckso-Stadlmayer notes 
conflicts with the classification of ombudsman offices into models.
42
 Indeed Buck et al observe that  ‘[I]t 
would be a mistake, however, to understand all ombudsman schemes as neatly fitting into any standard 
fixed and predictable model of ombudsmanry’.43   Somewhat paradoxically however it is this very diversity 
together with the shared universal characteristics of ombudsman which facilitate ombudsman being 
grouped into models and subsets of models. Indeed the classical ombudsman is today broadly 
acknowledged to be augmented by the model of the human rights ombudsmen
44
 and of the private industry 
ombudsmen.
45
  Further, within each of these ombudsman models, sub-groups have been identified.  So, for 
example Tai identifies six models of human rights ombudsmen
46
 and Reif identifies 10 different variations 
of public sector and private sector ombudsman mechanisms.
47
   
 
                                                 
39
 Heede, K. (2002) European Ombudsman: redress and control at Union level  Kluwer Law International 
79-112 
40
 Kuckso-Stadlmayer G (ed), (2008) European Ombudsman-Institutions Springer Wien New York, 61-65. 
41
 Harlow, C & Rawlings R. (1997)  Law and Administration. 
42
 Kuckso-Stadlmayer, European Ombudsman-InstitutionsSpringer Wien New York, 59. 
43
 Buck et al, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice 224. 
44
 Reif,LC. (2000) ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
Good Governance and Human Rights Protection’ 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal  23. 
45
 Seneviratne, Ombudsmen:  Public Services and Administrative Justice. 
46
 Tai, BYT. (2010) ‘Models of Ombudsmen and Human Rights Protection’ 1(1.3) International Journal of 
Politics and Good Governance 1. 
47
 Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System, 26-28. 
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The adoption of a particular model of classical ombudsman will depend upon institutional, cultural 
and personal factors. The longevity of an ombudsman institution may both result in, and be brought about 
by, adaptation and calibration of functions - in short, classical ombudsman adapt to changed operational 
environments. The increased heterogeneous nature of the classical ombudsman must therefore be viewed 
against the backdrop of shared fundamental norms of the ombudsman model.  While classical ombudsman 
may place differing emphasis upon the handling of individual complaints or the improvement of public 
administration the institution will continue to adapt and be successful if it adheres to the basic precepts of 
ombudsmanry such as independence, impartiality and maintenance of the rule of law. The identification of 
the three models of classical ombudsmen in this article confirms both the adaptability of the evolving 
nature of the ombudsman institution and demonstrates how it will continue to maintain its relevance.  The 
ombudsman  institution, now almost four decades old in Australia, has proven to be both nimble and 
responsive to external events while remaining intact with respect to its core features.     
 
